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Abstract. As research in quantum key distribution
network technologies grows larger and more complex,
the need for highly accurate and scalable simulation
technologies becomes important to assess the practical
feasibility and foresee difficulties in the practical imple-
mentation of theoretical achievements. In this paper,
we described the design of simplified simulation envi-
ronment of the quantum key distribution network with
multiple links and nodes. In such simulation environ-
ment, we analyzed several routing protocols in terms of
the number of sent routing packets, goodput and Packet
Delivery Ratio of data traffic flow using NS-3 simula-
tor.
Keywords
Network simulation, Quantum Key Distribu-
tion, routing protocols.
1. Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), based on the laws
of physics rather than the computational complexity of
mathematical problems, provides an Information The-
oretically Secure (ITS) way of establishing symmetrical
binary keys between two geographically distant users.
The keys are secure from eavesdropping during trans-
mission and QKD ensures that any third party’s knowl-
edge of the key is reduced to the level of guessing. Due
to the specificity of QKD link which requires optical
and Internet connection between the network nodes, it
is very costly to deploy a complete testbed containing
multiple network hosts and links to validate and verify
a certain network protocol or a specific network algo-
rithm. The network simulators in these circumstances
save a lot of money and time in accomplishing this task.
2. State of the Art
A simulation environment offers the creation of com-
plex network topologies, a high degree of control
and repeatable experiments, which in turn allows re-
searchers to conduct exactly the same experiments and
confirm their results. Unlike for conventional networks,
there are few software applications dealing with QKD.
Quantum Cryptography Protocol Simulator [1] devel-
oped using C/C++ architecture is able to analyze the
Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) and eavesdropper
influence on the performances of the quantum channel
when BB84 or B92 QKD protocol is used. A similar ap-
plication is reported in [2]. Object-oriented simulation
for QKD protocols was reported in [3] while an event-
by-event simulation model and polarizer as simulated
component for QKD protocols with the presence of
eavesdropper and misalignment measurement as sce-
narios were reported in [4]. A simulation framework
for QKD protocols using OptiSystem was reported in
[5], and a modeling framework designed to support the
development and performance analysis of practically
oriented QKD system representations was reported in
[6]. Yet all of these applications deal only with opti-
cal channel performance or QKD protocols and disre-
gard the public channel and the entirety of the protocol
stack above the quantum channel. To the best of our
knowledge, applications for simulating QKD networks
with multiple nodes and links are not available. There-
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fore, in this paper, we describe the design of simplified
simulation environment of QKD network with multi-
ple links and nodes. In such simulation environment,
we analyze several routing protocols in terms of the
number of sent routing packets, goodput and Packet
Delivery Ratio of data traffic flow.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 3. provides the basis of the QKD and de-
scribes the hop-by-hop communication approach used
in QKD network. The simulation setup is presented
in Section 4. , while in Section 5. we provide an
evaluation of obtained result and discuss the broader
aspects of our approach. Section 6. concludes this
study and outlines the future work.
3. Fundamentals of Quantum
Key Distribution
QKD networks differ from the traditional communi-
cation network in several aspects. One of the main
differences is reflected in the implementation of the
network link. A QKD link employs two distinct com-
munication channels between the parties: the quantum
channel, which is used for transmission of quantum key
material encoded in certain photon properties such as
polarization or phase, and the public channel, which
is used for verification of exchanged key material and
transmission of encrypted data (Fig. 1). A quantum
channel is always a point-to-point connection between
exactly two nodes [7] while public channel can be real-
ized as any conventional connection which may include
arbitrary number of intermediate devices [8].


















Fig. 1: Overview of a QKD link between two QKD nodes which
consist of an optical quantum channel (continuous red
line) and a public/classical channel (dashed blue line).
A second important feature of the QKD network is
reflected in the limited length of the links and maximal
transfer rate. Namely, due to absorption and scatter-
ing of polarized photons [9], [10], [11] and [12]], the
quantum channel can be realized by a direct optical
fiber or free line of sight only for a certain distance.
An equally important feature of the link is the amount
of key material that can be established in a unit of time
and this amount may vary due to humidity, tempera-
ture, the stability of devices, global radiation, pressure,
dust, sunshine duration or other factors [7] and [13].
However, it mostly depends on the length of the link
and it is often referred to as the key generation rate or
simply key rate.
The maximum length of the link and the key rate are
usually used to evaluate the QKD system. A chrono-
logical look at previously deployed QKD networks re-
veals a rapid improvement in the development of quan-
tum equipment: QKD systems implemented in 2002 in
the DARPA BBN QKD network were able to achieve
a key rate of approximate 400 bps over 10 km [14]; In
2007 in SECOQC, the maximal key rate was 3.1 kbps
over 33 km [15], while the solutions presented in 2009 in
Tokyo achieved a key rate of 304 kbps over 45 km [16].
Although key rate results of up to 1 Mbps have been
reported [17], [18] and [19], such solutions are limited
to very short distances. Therefore, for current systems,
the distance at which a QKD link is possible is roughly
limited to 100 km in optical fibers, while the stable key
rate is currently restricted to a few tens or hundreds of
kbps depending on the distance [11] and [13].
Due to the limited key rate, links are organized in
the following way: both endpoints of the correspond-
ing link have key storages with limited capacity which
are gradually filled with the new key material, which
is subsequently used for the encryption/decryption of
data flow and QKD devices constantly generate keys at
their maximum key rate until the key storages are filled
[20]. The type of used encryption algorithm and the
amount of network traffic to be encrypted determines
the speed of emptying the key storage, often referred
as key consumption rate, while the key rate of the link
determines the key charging rate [7], [14] and [21]. If
there is no enough key material in the storage, encryp-
tion of data flow cannot be performed [22] and the link
can be characterized as "currently unavailable". To
provide Information-Theoretically Secure (ITS) com-
munication, in the public channel the key tends to be
applied with a One-Time Pad (OTP) cipher, which re-
quires the length of the key to be the same as the length
of the message that is to be encrypted. However, if the
ratio between the charging and consumption rates is
not appropriate [23] and [24], OTP cannot be used due
to the lack of key material, and using less secure al-
gorithms that do not require too much material such
as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) becomes in-
evitable [25].
QKD networks also differ from the conventional net-
works in terms of network organization. Although
there are theoretical and pioneering results in the field
of quantum repeaters and quantum relays [26], [27] and
[28], in practice they remain unachievable with current
technology [11] and [29]. Therefore, the communica-
tion within network usually takes place in a hop-by-
hop [30] or in a key relay manner [14] and [31]. Both
methods rely on the assumption that all nodes along
the path between the sender and receiver must be fully
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trusted [22] and [32]. However, this restriction can be
overcome when multiple path-based communication or
Quantum Network Coding [33] is used.
3.1. Routing in QKD Networks
Due to the specificity of QKD networks, the two re-
quirements for the selection of routing protocol are em-
phasized:
• Since the communication is usually performed on
hop-by-hop basis, it is necessary to minimize the
number of links by choosing the shortest path due
to key material consumption [7].
• Given that the main objective of QKD is to pro-
vide ITS communication, routing packet needs to
be either encrypted and authenticated or at least
authenticated [7]. This entails that the number of
routing packets in the network needs to be mini-
mized.
4. Simulation Setup
To test the performances of various routing protocols
in QKD network, we set up a network simulation of
6 fixed nodes forming the topology shown in Fig. 2
which was simulated in Network Simulator 3 (NS-3)
of version DCE 1.8 [34]. As noted above, if there is
sufficient key material to encrypt the data traffic that
flows over the QKD link, the link is seen as "available".
Otherwise, the QKD link is noted as "currently un-
available". To simulate such behaviour of QKD link,
we used the propagation delay of the point-to-point
connection between the nodes. At each point-to-point
link, the "virtual buffer" with initial amount of key ma-
terial is installed. The buffers are referred as "virtual"
because they do not perform real encryption of data
flow nor they use real key material. Virtual buffers
only measure the traffic and reduce its value by the
packet payload length. In this way, virtual buffers imi-






Fig. 2: Topology of simulated network in which data UDP
flow of rate 160 kbps between nodes A and F is es-
tablished. Nodes are connected with point-to-point
links.
When the key material is depleted, that is, when the
link is marked as "currently unavailable", the propa-
gation delay of the point-to-point link is increased to
value of 100 seconds stopping any kind of communica-
tion. Otherwise, the propagation delay is set to 2 ms,
which is the default value of point-to-point connection
in case when the QKD link is seen as "available". The
buffers are constantly charged with new key material
of constant rate, which means the simulated QKD link
can switch from the "available" to "currently unavail-
able" state and vice versa.
The reason for this simulation setup is a simple im-
itation of the availability of QKD link. Using of other
means, such as the shutdown of network interface will
result in informing the routing protocol which would
automatically broadcast this information. The de-
scribed simulation setup provides a simple imitation
of QKD network, and allows us to test various routing
protocols in a very simple way.
Table 1 presents the nodal model parameters includ-
ing the key generation rate, charging key rate, packet
size, and data traffic parameters. The parameters not
given here were the default parameters of the NS-3 sim-
ulator.
Tab. 1: Parameter values of the simulation.
Parameter Value
Total number of nodes 6
Packet Size 512 Bytes
Packet Traffic Type UDP; CBR
Packet Traffic Rate 160 kbps
Initial amount of key material (link A–B) 6422.528 kBytes
Initial amount of key material (link B–C) 6422.528 kBytes
Initial amount of key material (link B–D) 6422.528 kBytes
Initial amount of key material (link D–E) 1429.648 kBytes
Initial amount of key material (link C–E) 1179.648 kBytes
Initial amount of key material (link E–F) 6422.528 kBytes
Charging key rate for all links 12.8 kBytes
Total Simulation time 300 seconds
5. Simulation Results
The parameters in Tab. 1 indicate the links C–E and
D–E have the least amount of initial key material.
As tested routing protocols have no information about
the status of virtual buffers, they need to choose be-
tween one of the two available paths: A–B–D–E–F or
A–B–C–E–F. Yet, after a while, the usage of any of
these paths results in a disruption of communication
since the available key material is quickly consumed.
Then, the routing protocol needs to choose an alterna-
tive route while the depleted link is charging. Further,
when the used link is depleted again, the routing pro-
tocol switches to an alternate path and so on.
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Routing protocols are broadly classified into proac-
tive and reactive routing protocols. In a reactive
routing protocol such as AODV, routing paths are
searched only when needed, mainly by flooding the
network. The discovery procedure terminates when ei-
ther a route has been found, or no route is available
after all route permutations have been checked. Con-
versely, the proactive routing protocol, such as DSDV,
OLSR or OSPF, continuously evaluate routes to all
reachable nodes and attempt to maintain consistent,
up-to-date routing information, by exchanging period-
ically its routing tables (OLSR, DSDV) or exchanging
network topology information (OSPF) [35].
AODV is an on-demand variation of distance vector
reactive routing protocol which determines a route to
a destination only when a route is required. Each node
maintains a table with information referring to the first
neighbor. This table is updated using periodic Hello
messages that are locally broadcast messages utilized
to indicate link availability. By default, AODV broad-
cast Hello messages each second and failure to receive
Hello message in "allowed hello loss interval", which is
set to 2 seconds by default, indicates a loss of connec-
tivity to that neighbor. When a route for the desired
destination is not available or when a routing table en-
try expires after a predetermined period, a route dis-
covery request is flooded through the network. The
obtained route is maintained as long as it is needed by
the source.
OSPF is a widely deployed link-state routing pro-
tocol which means that each router maintains a link-
state database describing the network topology. This
database is updated using Link State Announce-
ment (LSA) update information. From the link-state
database, each router constructs a tree of shortest
paths with itself as the root. By default, OSPF floods
LSA each 30 minutes and it exchanges Hello packets to
establish and maintain a neighbor relationship on each
10 seconds. If a node does not receive a Hello mes-
sage from a neighbor within a "dead interval time",
OSPF modifies its topology database to indicate that
the neighbor is unavailable. This fixed time interval
specifies the time that OSPF waits before declaring
the neighbor node to be unavailable. By default, it
is set to four times the default hello interval, which is
40 seconds in case of point-to-point networks.
OLSR is based on a proactive link-state approach,
which makes it very similar to OSPF. It uses Hello
and Topology Control (TC) routing messages to dis-
cover and disseminate link-state information through
the network. OLSR reduces the control traffic over-
head by using Multipoint Relays (MPR), which is the
key idea behind OLSR. The MPR node is a node’s one
hop neighbor which has been chosen to forward pack-
ets. Instead of pure flooding of the network, packets
are forwarded by node’s MPRs. This delimits the net-
work overhead, thus being more efficient than pure link
state routing protocols. By default, OLSR node sends
Hello messages each 2 seconds while TC messages are
exchanged each 5 seconds. The holding time is usually
three times the Hello message period. Therefore, a link
breakage is detected after 6 seconds in the worst case.
DSDV is the most popular proactive routing protocol
based on the distributed Bellman-Ford algorithm. In
DSDV, each node maintains two tables. One of them is
the permanent routing table in which all of the possi-
ble destinations within the network, the address of next
hop and the total number of hops to reach the destina-
tion are listed. Each node is in charge to periodically
broadcast its routing table to its neighbor nodes by
using periodic update packets based on periodic route
update interval which is set to 15 seconds by default.
After receiving of the update packet, the neighbor node
updates its routing table by incrementing the number
of hops by one and forwards the packet further in the
network. The process is repeated until all the nodes in
the network receive a copy of the update packet with
a corresponding value. To avoid the formation of rout-
ing loops, entries in the routing table are marked with
a sequence number. In addition to regular periodic
updates, DSDV uses triggered updates when the net-
work topology suddenly changes. The main purpose
of these updates is to advertise the information that
has changed since the last periodic update. However,
if a periodic and triggered update occurs in a short pe-
riod of time, the values may be merged and the only
periodic update will be performed. To limit the prop-
agation of unstable information, the transmission of
triggered updates is delayed using settling time which
is recorded in the second DSDV table for each destina-
tion node. By default, settling time is set to 5 seconds
[35].
Table 2 presents the obtained values based on the
number of sent routing data. Packet Delivery Ratio
(PDR) which is calculated as the ratio of received and
sent application packets, is used to assess the effective-
ness of the routing protocol within the specified simula-
tion environment. Table 2 shows that AODV reactive
routing protocol sends the largest number of routing
packets and has the same PDR as OSPF routing pro-
tocol. However, AODV floods route request and hello
Tab. 2: Comparison of the obtained values. The number
of routing packets and Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR)
which is calculated as the ratio of received and sent ap-
plication packets is used to assess the effectiveness of
the routing protocol.
Routing data Application data
Routing protocol Packets Bytes PDR (%)
AODV 6714 335728 35.645
OLSR 4441 372102 73.5627
OSPFv2 1268 107392 35.645
DSDV 914 65580 44.2149
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Fig. 3: Comparison of traffic generated by routing protocols.
messages which result in a fast reduction of available
key material. This is evident from Fig. 3 where it is
shown that in last 60 seconds of the simulation there is
no AODV traffic due to lack of available key material.
OSPF sends Hello packets each 10 seconds and on
40th second of the simulation, OSPF exchange the LSA
information which is shown as a large peak of OSPF
graph on Fig. 3. Due to the large value of "dead in-
terval time", OSPF is not able to react quickly to the
changes of the network topology which finally results
in a low PDR.
On the other side, the small value of hello and dead
interval allows OLSR to react quickly to the changes
of a network topology which results in the highest
PDR. OLSR floods Hello and TC packets each 2 and
4 seconds, respectively, which results in almost con-
stant propagation of the routing packets. In addition,
the flooding based on MPR reduces the consumption
of scarce key material when compared to AODV. Al-
though OLSR provides best results in the view of PDR,
OLSR is based on constant flooding of the network
which is contrary to the requirements specified in Sub-
section 3.1.
Finally, as shown in Fig. 3, distribution of DSDV
packets is almost regular with the period of 15 seconds.
DSDV sends the least number of packets and achieves
better PDR then well-known OSPF.
Fig. 4: Goodput of the UDP data flow between nodes A and F.
The results from Tab. 2 are shown in Fig. 4 from
where it can be seen that AODV and OSPF have the
same selection of paths which results in the same PDR.
OLSR and DSDV alternately choose the available path
which provides the better PDR.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a simple way to mimic
QKD network. In such an environment, we tested sev-
eral routing protocols with reference to the number of
routing packets and Packet Delivery Ratio. It is impor-
tant to stress that none of the simulated routing pro-
tocols has built-in mechanisms of congestion detection
or QoS mechanisms. Although OSPF routing protocol
was used in previously deployed QKD networks [20],
[36] and [37], we have shown that DSDV provides bet-
ter network performances since it provides better PDR
with a smaller amount of routing information. On the
other hand, AODV and OLSR seem not to be appro-
priate for QKD network due to the large amount of
routing data that are flooded throughout the network.
The main contribution of this paper is the presen-
tation of a simple way to mimic the behavior of QKD
network and the performance analysis of the different
routing protocols in such simulated environment.
Our future work will focus on developing dedicated
simulation module which will allow a more detailed
analysis of QKD network.
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